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Equilibrium Bandwidth and Buffer Allocations
for Elastic Traffics
Steven H. Low, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Consider a set of users sharing a network node under
an allocation scheme that provides each user with a fixed minimum
and a random extra amount of bandwidth and buffer. Allocations
and prices are adjusted to adapt to resource availability and user
demands. Equilibrium is achieved when all users optimize their
utility and demand equals supply for nonfree resources. We an-
alyze two models of user behavior. We show that at equilibrium
expected return on purchasing variable resources can be higher
than that on fixed resources. Thus users must balance the mar-
ginal increase in utility due to higher return on variable resources
and the marginal decrease in utility due to their variability. For the
first user model we further show that at equilibrium where such
tradeoff is optimized all users hold strictly positive amounts of vari-
able bandwidth and buffer. For the second model we show that if
both variable bandwidth and buffer are scarce then at equilibrium
every user either holds both variable resources or none.
Index Terms—Bandwidth and buffer allocation, elastic traffic,
equilibrium allocation, equilibrium pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS PAPER is motivated by two emerging trends in
packet-switched networks in the past decade. The first is the
increasing popularity of resource reservation as a means to
guarantee quality of service (QoS), as exemplified by the recent
standards on the mechanism (but not the algorithm) of resource
reservation, e.g., [31], [22]. However, unlike circuit-switched or
leased-line networks where reservation takes the form of a fixed
amount of dedicated bandwidth, in packet-switched networks,
it may also include a variable component, as in the available
bit rate (ABR) service of an ATM network where a user can
receive a minimum cell rate (MCR) plus some random extra
bandwidth. In response to the first phenomenon is the design
of a large number of packet-scheduling policies to provide the
reserved bandwidth to competing users; some recent examples
include, e.g., generalized processor sharing of [19], a family of
fair-queueing algorithms [8], [27], and the virtual partitioning
policy of [16], etc; also see [30] for a survey of several earlier
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schemes. The common theme across these algorithms is that
a user is guaranteed a minimum share of resources and gets
random extra amounts depending on network condition. For
elastic traffics [25] that can tolerate some degree of delay
or loss, buffer is also a scarce resource to be traded-off in
network resource allocation, e.g., [11], [7], [20], [6]. Again,
buffer allocation can be implemented by schemes ranging from
complete partitioning, in which all users are guaranteed fixed
amounts of buffer, to complete sharing, in which no user is
guaranteed any fixed amounts of buffer, e.g., [4].
In this paper we describe a novel model for such bandwidth
and buffer allocation schemes and study the equilibrium alloca-
tion that would result when users interact under such schemes.
We consider the idealized situation where users can freely
choose their shares of fixed and variable bandwidth or buffer to
maximize their benefit. The network coordinates their choices
through resource pricing. This approach seems more desirable
than one in which the network decides the allocation to all users
without regard to their individual valuation of resources. A crit-
ical issue in such an approach concerns equilibrium: whether an
equilibrium exists, how it might be approached and what prop-
erties it possesses. This paper presents a first step in answering
these questions. Equilibrium is desirable as it is Pareto optimal
when the utility functions are concave increasing, i.e., it is not
possible to increase the utility of any user without decreasing
that of others [28]. Moreover, equilibrium is critical in under-
standing and controlling a large variety of natural, social, and
manmade systems. For instance, flow control has been formu-
lated as a welfare maximization in [13], [1] where the objective
is to maximize aggregate user utility over bandwidth allocation,
subject to capacity constraints at network resources. There the
flow control mechanism is derived as a distributed gradient pro-
jection algorithm to solve the dual problem, in which network
links adjust prices according to the rule of supply and demand
and users adjust their rates to maximize their own benefit, in
much the same way as the models and algorithms presented
below. The unique equilibrium is the stable point to which all
trajectories of source rates converge. Moreover, it determines
the fairness of the allocation. The key difference here is the in-
clusion of buffer resource and the differentiation of fixed and
variable resources. This greatly complicates the equilibrium sit-
uation.
In Section II, we describe two models of allocating variable
bandwidth and buffer. In Sections III and IV, we present our
equilibrium analysis for each of the models. Some implications
of the results are explained in Section V.
1063–6692/00$10.00 © 2000 IEEE
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II. MODEL, ASSUMPTIONS, AND NOTATIONS
A. Model
For our purposes a network provides two types of resources,
bandwidth and buffer, in two flavors, fixed and variable. A band-
width allocation is specified by a pair x = (x0; x1)  0,
with the interpretation that a fixed amount x0R0 and a random
amount x1R1 of bandwidth will be made available to a user that
is granted the allocation x. Similarly a buffer allocation is spec-
ified by a pair y = (y0; y1)  0, with the interpretation that,
if granted, a fixed amount y0B0 and a random amount y1B1 of
buffer will be made available. Here, R0 > 0, B0 > 0 are real
numbers and R1  0, B1  0 are (almost surely) nonnegative
random variables. R1 and B1 are generally statistically depen-
dent. They model the random fluctuation of resource availability
in a real network.
The network also sets prices on the resources. Fixed band-
width is priced at p0 per R0 amount and variable bandwidth is
priced at p1 per R1 (random) amount. Fixed buffer is priced at
q0 per B0 amount and variable buffer is priced at q1 per B1
amount. An allocation (x; y) = (x0; x1; y0; y1) thus costs
px+ qy = p0x0 + p1x1 + q0y0 + q1y1. Hence a user is priced
not on the actual amounts of resources that are made available
to it (which is random depending on the realization of R1 and
B1), but on its reservation (x; y).
The network is shared by a set of users 1; . . . ; N . User n is
free to choose a bandwidth and buffer allocation (xn; yn) it de-
sires and pays px
n
+ qy
n
for it, if granted. User n then receives
a random amount r = xR of bandwidth and a random amount
b = yB of buffer, where xR = x0R0+x1R1 and yB = y0B0+
y1B1. This provides user n a utility of un(E(r+b); var(r+b)),
where un is a deterministic function from <  <+ to <. We
will assume below that the utility function un(; v) is strictly
increasing in  and strictly decreasing in v. This assumes that
user n’s preference depends on the (random) resources (r; b)
only through their first two moments. Moreover, increasing the
mean allocation increases user n’s utility, while increasing the
variance of the allocation decreases its utility. This is motivated
by the fact that the performance of applications typically im-
proves as they get more network resources and degrades as the
availability of these resources fluctuates.1
Example 1: First, note that R0 and R1 (and similarly for B0
and B1) are just the units of accounting, and not the total ca-
pacity to be shared by competing users. The total capacities areP
n
x
n0R0 and
P
n
x
n1R1. In multilayer coded video transmis-
sion, a user (sender) transmits a base layer and an additional
layer to enhance the quality. Suppose each user n requests, and
is guaranteed, a rate xn0 for its base layer. The user also requests
an allocation of xn1 for its enhancement layer but will receive
a random amount depending on network condition. Buffer is
needed to prevent loss when the user’s instantaneous rate ex-
ceeds the available bandwidth. Similarly, buffer can be allocated
to user n according to its reservation specified by (yn0; yn1).
1The value of bandwidth and buffer to an application may be different. Often
this effect can be modeled by including in the utility function appropriate
weights , , the utility being un(E(r + b); var(r + b)) instead.
All results in the paper generalize in a straightforward manner to the case of
nonunity weights.
In this paper, we consider two models of user behavior. In the
first model M1, we assume that user n is endowed with an ini-
tial allocation xn = (xn0; xn1) > 0 and yn = (yn0; yn1) > 0.
User n’s goal is to purchase a possibly new allocation (x
n
; y
n
)
by selling some of its initial holdings so as to maximize its ben-
efit, i.e., it solves the following maximization problem:
M1:
max
(x; y)0
un(E(xR+ yB); var(xR+ yB))   (px+ qy)
subject to px+ qy = pxn + qyn:
The constraint says that the new resource cost of user n, the
left-hand side, remains the same as user n’s initial cost, the
right-hand side. This is desirable because (if the prices here are
not just control signals, but indeed form part of the monetary
tariff paid by the users) users will then face the same connec-
tion charge throughout their service period even though their al-
locations may fluctuate in response to changes in resource avail-
ability or user demands.
Model M1 excludes the possibility that a user may wish to
purchase more resources than their current holdings and enjoy a
higher quality, or less to save. This is permitted in the next model
where the budget constraint is removed and user n chooses its
allocation to solve
M2:
max
(x;y)0
un(E(xR+ yB); var(xR+ yB))   (px+ qy):
In both M1 and M2 the allocations (xn; yn) are restricted
to be nonnegative. A variant of M1 where the nonnegativity
constraint on (xn; yn) is removed is treated in [12]. It models
users (resellers) who can both buy and sell bandwidth and
buffers among themselves through the network. The nonnega-
tivity constraint here turns out to destroy the simple structure
of the process and greatly complicates the analysis.
Let Xi =
P
n xni (respectively, Xi =
P
n xni) and Yi =P
n yni (respectively, Y i =
P
n yni) denote the total demand
for (respectively, supply of) bandwidth and buffer i, respec-
tively. For model M2 X and Y represent the capacity in the
network. We focus on the equilibrium situation.
Definition 1: A set of allocation vectors (xn, yn,
n = 1; . . . ; N )  0 and a price vector (p; q)  0 form
a competitive equilibrium (or just equilibrium) if
1) (xn; yn) solves the maximization problem for all users
n; and
2) for i = 0; 1, Xi  Xi, Yi  Y i, and pi(Xi  X i) = 0,
qi(Yi   Y i) = 0.
We call (p; q) an equilibrium price and (xn; yn; n =
1; . . . ; N ) an equilibrium allocation.
Hence at equilibrium all users n achieve their optimality
given the price vector (p; q), and for all nonfree resources,
demand (Xi; Yi) equals supply (X i; Y i).
B. Assumptions and Notation
We make the following assumptions:
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A1: ER1 > 0, EB1 > 0, cov(R1; B1) 6= 0, and that R1
and B1 are linearly independent (i.e., there exists no
constant a such that R1 = aB1 almost surely).
A2: u
n
(; v) : <  < ! < is jointly concave in its
arguments and satisfies
@un
@
(; v) > 0 and @un
@v
(; v) < 0:
A3: For all (; v) > 0,
@un
@
(; v)
 
@un
@v
(; v)
< 2
v

:
A4: For model M1, the current allocations are strictly pos-
itive, i.e., xni > 0 and yni > 0 for i = 0; 1, n =
1; . . . ; N .
Assumption A1 implies that the variabilities of bandwidth
and buffer are correlated. This is certainly so if they model
the left-over resources from serving higher priority users. As
discussed in the last section, by A2 we assume that user n’s
utility increases with the mean allocation and decreases with
its variance. In practice un can be restricted to a finite region.
Assumption A3 is technical. Its sole purpose is to rule out the
unnatural case where some users may desire at optimality only
variable bandwidth without fixed bandwidth nor any buffer,
fixed or variable, or only variable buffer without fixed buffer
nor any bandwidth, fixed or variable (Lemma 4 in Section
III-D). Though reasonable, A3 is admittedly quite restrictive,
but as the example in Section III-B shows, it is not necessary
for the main results to hold.
Let r = ER1, b = EB1 be the means of R1 and
B1 respectively. Let 2R = var(R1), 2B = var(B1),
and c = cov(R1; B1). As in the last subsection
(xn; yn) = (xn0; xn1; yn0; yn1) denotes user n’s allo-
cation, Xi =
P
n xni (respectively, Xi =
P
n xni) and
Yi =
P
n yni (respectively, Y i =
P
n yni) denote the total
demand for (respectively, supply of) bandwidth and buffer i,
respectively.
Define for (x; y) = (x0; x1; y0; y1)
fn(x; y) = un((x; y); v(x; y)) (1)
where
(x; y) =xER+ y EB
=x0R0 + y0B0 + x1r + y1b (2)
v(x; y) = var(xR+ yB)
=2Rx
2
1 + 
2
By
2
1 + 2cx1y1: (3)
For model M1, since pxn + qyn is constrained to be a constant
given price (p; q) > 0, user n’s maximization problem is equiv-
alent to
M1:
max
(x; y)0
fn(x; y)
subject to px+ qy = pxn + qyn:
For model M2, it is
M2:
max
(x; y)0
fn(x; y)   (px+ qy):
In the following we will use (xn(p; q); yn(p; q)) to denote user
n’s solution at prices (p; q).
III. EQUILIBRIUM OF M1
In this section we first discuss how an equilibrium might be
approached through simple price adjustment schemes. Then we
present some interesting properties on equilibrium prices and
allocations. Finally we prove these results. As can be seen the
proof on equilibrium allocations can be quite intricate but te-
dious.
A. Convergence
Using standard equilibrium analysis (see, e.g., [18]) we can
show that a competitive equilibrium exists for model M1. The
basic idea of the proof in [18] is to apply Kukatani’s fixed point
theorem to establish that an equilibrium is a solution of an ap-
propriate welfare maximization whose maximizer obviously ex-
ists.
Proposition 1: There exists a competitive equilibrium.
Suppose the network dynamically adjusts prices (p; q) based
on user demands (X; Y ) and supply (X; Y ), and users dynam-
ically make requests (xn; yn), n = 1; . . . ; N , based on current
prices. The system dynamic depends on how the resources are
rationed and their prices adjusted before equilibrium is reached,
i.e., when the total requested allocation (X; Y ) is not equal to
the total supply (X; Y ). Once equilibrium is reached, if ever, no
source has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from it (a Nash
equilibrium). The prices and the requests can be described by a
continuous time dynamical system where prices (p(t); q(t)) at
time t are solutions to
( _p(t); _q(t)) = (g1(x(t); y(t)); g2(x(t); y(t)): (4)
Here gi : <4N ! < are the price adjustment rules, based
on user requests, and (x(t); y(t)) = (xn(t); yn(t); n =
1; . . . ; N ) is the vector of user requests at time t that solves
the user maximization problem M1 using current prices
(p(t); q(t)). Will the system converge to an equilibrium under
simple rules (g1; g2) that do not require the knowledge of user
utility functions on the part of the network?
Before reviewing three classes of such algorithms, we re-
mark that (4) tacitly assumes that users n are memoryless in
that their decisions at time t are independent of decisions at all
other times, future or past, given the current prices. For model
M1, the constraint also implies that, before an equilibrium is
reached, resources are rationed in such a way that every user
n’s resource cost is always equal to the cost of its initial al-
location at current prices (p(t); q(t)) so that user n faces the
same cost throughout. A simple way to ensure this is to always
allocate to user n its initial allocation before an equilibrium is
reached. Alternatively we can interpret the dynamical system as
modeling a request phase (a tatonnement process [28]) where,
iteratively, users make requests and the network adjusts prices
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until the market (approximately) clears and an equilibrium is
(approximately) reached. Only then are the users’ allocations
actually changed.
To simplify notation let Z = (X  X; Y   Y ) be the vector
of excess demands for the resources and s = (p; q) be their
prices. Z(t) denotes the excess demands at current prices s(t).
The simplest scheme is to adjust the price according to the law
of supply and demand: if there is excess demand for a resource,
raise its price; otherwise, reduce it. That is
_s(t) = Z(t): (5)
This scheme does not converge in general [23], but it does con-
verge at least locally if the aggregate demand Z satisfies a gross
substitute condition [21, pp. 167, 171, 173] @Zi=@si < 0 and
@Zi=@sj > 0 for i 6= j, i; j = 1; . . . ; 4. The condition means
that raising the price of a resource decreases its demand and in-
creases the demand for other resources. It imposes certain con-
ditions on the user utility functions un [5].
When the gross substitute condition does not hold, a global
Newton scheme is described in [26] that essentially scales the
vector of excess demand vector Z by the inverse (if exists) of its
gradient matrix rZ = [@Zi=@sj ]:
_s(t) = [rZ] 1(t) Z(t):
It is shown there that, starting from a boundary point, the prices
and allocations converge to an equilibrium when the excess de-
mandZ is merely continuous and satisfies a mild boundary con-
dition.
A path-following algorithm has been proposed, and its con-
vergence proved, in [29] where the network adjusts prices by
solving a simple minimization problem based on the excess de-
mand. Essentially the price of the resource with the largest ex-
cess is raised until there is no excess.
Note that all of the above schemes use only the excess demand
and do not require the knowledge of individual utilities on the
part of the network. Equilibrium can be approached under suit-
able conditions. It is hence important to examine the properties
of an equilibrium, to which we now turn.
B. Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
It is well known that an equilibrium price (p; q)
only gives relative prices of the resources in that if
(xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is an equilibrium allocation at
price (p; q), then it is also an equilibrium allocation at price
(p; q) for all  > 0. The first part of the following theorem
then shows that for an equilibrium price (p; q), p0 > 0 and
hence we can assume without loss of generality (after possibly
a change of units) that p0 = R0 = q0 = B0 = 1.
Theorem 2: If (p; q) is an equilibrium price then
i) p0 > 0, q0 > 0 and hence X0 = X0; Y0 = Y 0. More-
over R0=p0 = B0=q0;
ii) p1  r or q1  b after scaling so that p0 = R0 = q0 =
B0 = 1.
LetP = f(p; q)  0j p0 = q0 = 1; p1  r, or q1  bg. The
theorem says that we can restrict equilibrium prices to the set
P . Indeed if c > 0 then we can strengthen the result to “p1  r
Fig. 1. Region of feasible equilibrium prices. Shaded region is not feasible. If
c > 0 the feasible region is the lower left rectangle at the origin.
and q1  b,” as shown in the next subsection.2 The theorem is
illustrated in Fig. 1.
To interpret the theorem we think of ERi=pi and EBi=qi
as the total return on investing in resource i. Theorem 2 then
implies that at equilibrium the total return on fixed resources
is equal, and the total expected return on variable resources is
generally higher. From assumption A2 that variable resources
cause a reduction in utility because of their variance. At equi-
librium since all users achieve optimality the marginal increase
in utility by exchanging one dollar worth of fixed resources for
one dollar worth of variable resources must be balanced by the
marginal decrease in utility due to increased variability.
It is then interesting to find that in equilibrium every user
holds strictly positive amounts of variable bandwidth and buffer,
as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 3: If (p; q; xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is an equilib-
rium with p1 > 0 or q1 > 0, then xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all
n.
From Definition 1 equilibrium price p1 = 0 or q1 = 0 if there
are excess variable resources. The qualification that “p1 > 0 or
q1 > 0” restricts the theorem to the situation where not both
variable bandwidth and buffer are in excess. Indeed if c < 0
then the qualification is not necessary (Proposition 6).
The theorem has a similar flavor to the well known fact in the
context of investment where it is optimal for every investor to
diversify [24], [10], [17], [9]. The security models there how-
ever have an important difference: investors are allowed to hold
short positions, i.e., (xn; yn) can be negative as well as posi-
tive. The case that allows negative allocations is treated in [12].
The nonnegativity constraint in our model complicates greatly
the equilibrium analysis.
We now illustrate the results with a numerical example.
Example 2—Dynamics of Model M1: In this example, there
are N = 4 users whose utility functions are
un(; v) =   log
2
v + n
2The covariance c of R1 andB1 may be positive if, for example,R1 andB1
model the leftover resources not consumed by higher-priority traffics where a
surge in higher-priority traffics leads to reduction in both R1 and B1.
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Fig. 2. Prices. Prices are normalized with (p0(t); q0(t)) = (1; 1). Dash line
with square is the price p1(t) for variable bandwidth and that with diamond is
q1(t) for variable buffer.
Fig. 3. Excess demands. Dash line with square is the excess demand for
variable bandwidth and that with diamond is the excess demand for variable
buffer. The excess demands for the fixed bandwidth and fixed buffer follow
identical trajectory represented by the solid line.
where 
n
= n. Every user has the same initial allocation
(xn; yn) = (1; 1; 1; 1), i.e., all resources are evenly allocated
to the users initially. We will see that the resources will not
be evenly distributed across users at equilibrium because of
the difference in their utilities. We take R0 = B0 = 1 and
r = b = 4, i.e., the variable resources have an expected value
four times that of fixed resources. The variability is described
by 2
R
= 1:5, 2
B
= 1, and c = 0:5. Hence bandwidth has a
higher variability than buffer and they are positively correlated.
Prices are adjusted according to (5) in proportion to excess
demand with a constant of proportionality  = 0:05.
Starting from an initial price of (p(0); q(0)) = (1; 1; 1; 1),
the system dynamic is illustrated in Figs. 2–5. Fig. 2 depicts
the normalized prices with p0(t) and q0(t) set to 1 in each itera-
tion. The price for variable buffer is higher than that for variable
bandwidth because variable buffer has a less variance and hence
Fig. 4. Allocations of user n = 1. Dash line with square is the variable
bandwidth allocation and that with diamond is the variable buffer allocation. The
allocation for the fixed bandwidth and fixed buffer follow identical trajectory
represented by the solid line.
Fig. 5. Variable bandwidth allocations. The allocation for user 1 is the lowest
line, that for user 2 is the second lowest line, . . ., and that for user 4 is the highest
line.
a higher demand. Fig. 3 shows that the excess demands all con-
verge to zero as all prices are strictly positive. Fig. 4 describes
the allocations for user n = 1. It is more interesting to compare
allocations across users. User n has a strictly larger marginal
decrease j@un=@vj = 1=(v+n) in utility due to resource vari-
ability than user n+1, and hence it favors less variable resources
than user n + 1, as shown in Fig. 5.
Note that both Theorems 2 and 3 hold even though the utility
functions do not satisfy assumption A3. The stability of the
simple price adjustment scheme however can be sensitive to
problem parameters. 
C. Proof of Theorem 2
First, note that fn(xn; yn) is strictly increasing in (x0; y0)
(but not necessarily in x1; y1). Hence if p0 = 0 or q0 = 0
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then X0 > X0 or Y0 > Y 0 respectively, violating Defini-
tion 1. Hence p0 > 0, q0 > 0 and X0 = X0, Y0 = Y 0. If
p0=R0 > q0=B0 then xn0 = 0 for all n, violating the defini-
tion of equilibrium. To see this, suppose a user n has x
n0 > 0.
It can change its allocation of fixed resources from (xn0; yn0)
to (0; yn0 + xn0p0=q0) which increases  without affecting v.
This increases its utility fn, contradicting that (xn; yn) is op-
timal for n. Hence p0=R0  q0=B0. A similar argument shows
that p0=R0  q0=B0 and hence p0=R0 = q0=B0.
To prove part ii, scale the equilibrium price such that p0 =
R0 = q0 = B0 = 1. If p1 > r and q1 > b then we claim that
xn1 = 0 and yn1 = 0 for all n, violating the condition for equi-
librium. Otherwise, if x
n1 > 0 or yn1 > 0 for some n, then user
n can sell all its variable resources and buy an additional amount
(xn1p1 + yn1q1)=p0 of fixed bandwidth. This strictly increases
 and decreases v, and hence increases the utility, contradicting
the optimality of (xn; yn).
Indeed if c > 0 then both p1  r and q1  b. Otherwise sup-
pose p1 > r. Then a user with positive amount of xn1 can sell
it and purchase an additional amount xn1p1=p0 of fixed band-
width. This increases the  and decreases v, a contradiction.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
First note that it follows directly from assumption A2 and
(2)–(3) that the objective function fn(x; y) is concave in (x; y),
and hence the first order optimality condition is both necessary
and sufficient.
Define the Lagrangian function
L(x
n
; y
n
; 
n
; ^
n
; ^
n
)
= fn(xn; yn)  n(pxn + qyn   pxn   qyn)
+ ^nxn + ^nyn:
Then (xn; yn)  0 is optimal for user n if and only if there exist
n, ^n  0, and ^n  0 such that [2]
rxfn   np+ ^n = 0
ryfn   nq + ^n = 0
pxn + qyn = pxn + qyn
^nixni = 0; ^niyni = 0; i = 0; 1:
In view of Theorem 2 we will fix for the rest of this paper that
p0 = R0 and q0 = B0 for an equilibrium price (p; q). Define
n(x; y) =
@un
@
((x; y); v(x; y))
 2
@un
@v
((x; y); v(x; y))
> 0
a1 = r   p1
a2 = b  q1
A =

2R c
c 2B

:
Then expanding rfn in the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker condition,
eliminating n, and noting p0^n0 = q0^n0, we have that
(xn; yn)  0 is optimal for user n if and only if
A

xn1
yn1

=n(xn; yn)

a1
a2

(6)
 

p1
q1

n0 +

n1
n1

(7)
pxn + qyn = pxn + qyn (8)
n0xn0 = 0; n0yn0 = 0 (9)
n1xn1 = 0; n1yn1 = 0 (10)
for some n0  0, n1  0, and n1  0. Moreover, by as-
sumption A1 the matrixA in (7) is invertible and its determinant
jAj = 2R
2
B   c
2 > 0 (Schwarz inequality). Finally define i
by

1
2

= A 1

a1
a2

=
1
jAj

2Ba1   ca2
2Ra2   ca1

: (11)
The next lemma is a consequence of assumption A3. It says
that it is never optimal for a user n to reserve only variable band-
width without fixed bandwidth nor any buffer, fixed or variable,
nor is it optimal to reserve only variable buffer without fixed
buffer nor any bandwidth, fixed or variable.
Lemma 4: Under assumption A3 there exists no price
(p; q)  0with (p; q) 6= 0 for which (xn; yn) = (0; 0; xn1; 0)
or (xn; yn) = (0; 0; 0; yn1) is optimal for user n.
Proof: Suppose (xn; yn) = (0; 0; xn1; 0) is optimal for
a user n under price (p; q)  0. We will show that this contra-
dicts assumption A3. The proof that (xn; yn) = (0; 0; 0; yn1)
cannot be optimal follows a similar argument.
Since (p; q) 6= 0 and xn > 0 and yn > 0, we have from (8)
xn1 =
pxn + qyn
p1
 xn1 > 0: (12)
Since xn1 > 0, n1 = 0 by complementary slackness, and
hence from (7)
2Rxn1 = n(xn; yn)a1   p1n0
or
n(xn; yn)a1  
2
Rxn1:
But 0 < a1 = r   p1  r. Hence
n(xn; yn)  xn1
2R
r
:
Substituting (xn; yn) = (0; 0; xn1; 0) into n and noting that
(xn; yn) = xn1r; and v(xn; yn) = x2n12R
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we have
@un
@
((xn; yn); v(xn; yn))
 
@un
@v
((xn; yn); v(xn; yn))
 2
v(x
n
; y
n
)
(xn; yn)
:
But v(xn; yn) = x2n12R  x
2
n1
2
R
by (12), contradicting as-
sumption A3. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The next lemma is used in the proof of Proposition 6. It says in
particular that if c < 0 then an equilibrium allocation (xn; yn)
cannot have xn1 = 0 and yn1 = 0. This is a weaker form of
Proposition 6 which asserts that indeed both xn1 and yn1 are
strictly positive, for all n.
Lemma 5: Suppose c < 0. If (xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is an
equilibrium allocation, then
i) xn1 > 0 or yn1 > 0;
ii) 2
R
xn1 + cyn1 > 0 or cxn1 + 
2
B
yn1 > 0.
Proof: i) Suppose for the contrary that xn1 = 0 and yn1 =
0. Since p0 > 0 and q0 > 0 at equilibrium, (8) implies that
xn0 > 0 or yn0 > 0, which then implies that n0 = 0 by
complementary slackness. From (7) we have a1 = a2 = 0, or
p1 = r > 0 and q1 = b > 0. Then for any user m, (7) implies
xm1
ym1

= A 1

 

p1
q1

m0 +

m1
m1

(13)
since c < 0 entries of A 1 are all positive. (13) then implies
that m0 = 0. Otherwise, xm0 = ym0 = 0, and hence neither
“xm1 = ym2 = 0” (contradicting the budget constraint) nor
“xm1 > 0 and ym2 > 0” [contradicting (13)] nor “exactly
one of xm1 and ym1 is positive” (contradicting Lemma 4). But
m0 = 0 in (13) can only be satisfied by xm1 = ym1 = 0
because of complementary slackness. Thus we have proved that
if there exists n such that xn1 = yn1 = 0, then X1 = Y1 = 0,
contradicting that p1 > 0 and q1 > 0. Hence for all n, xn1 > 0
or yn1 > 0.
ii) Suppose not. Then
 cyn1  
2
Rxn1 (14)
 cxn1  
2
B
yn1: (15)
If xn1 = 0 then yn1 > 0 by i), contradicting (15). Similarly
xn1 > 0 and yn1 = 0 contradicts (14). If xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0,
then c2  2
R
2
B
, a contradiction. This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3, which says that at equilibrium every user desires
strictly positive amounts of random resources, is proved by the
next two propositions, one for the case c < 0 and the other for
c > 0. The main idea in the proof of the next proposition is that
if xn1 and yn1 are not both positive then xn0 and yn0 are both
zero, contradicting Lemma 4.
Proposition 6: Suppose c < 0. If (xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N )
is an equilibrium allocation, then xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all
n.
Proof: We start with a simple lemma that says that when
R1 and B1 are negatively correlated then there is some user that
holds strictly positive amounts of variable bandwidth and buffer.
Lemma 7: Suppose c < 0. If (xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is an
equilibrium allocation, then X1 > 0 and Y1 > 0.
Proof: Fix an equilibrium (p; q; xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ).
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that X1 = 0, i.e., xn1 = 0
for all n. By Lemma 4, xn0 > 0 or yn0 > 0, implying that
n0 = 0. Moreover p1 = 0 sinceX1 > 0 and p1(X1 X1) = 0.
Hence a1 = r   p1 = r > 0. Substituting xn1 = 0, n0 = 0,
p1 = 0 and a1 = r into (7) we have
cyn1  n(xn; yn)r > 0
which is impossible since c < 0. Hence X1 > 0. That Y1 > 0
is proved by a similar argument. 
Fix an equilibrium (p; q; xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ). From
Theorem 2 at least one of
a1 = r   p1 and a2 = b  q1
must be nonnegative. We will consider three alternatives sepa-
rately: ai  0, i = 1; 2 (proved in Lemma 8 below); a1  0
(proved in Lemma 9 below); and a2  0 (symmetric argument
omitted).
From (7) we have
2Rxn1 + cyn1 = n(xn; yn)a1   p1n0 + n1 (16)
cxn1 + 
2
Byn1 = n(xn; yn)a2   q1n0 + n1 (17)
for some n0  0, n1  0, n1  0.
Lemma 8: Suppose c < 0. If ai  0 for i = 1; 2 then
xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all n.
Proof: By Lemma 5-ii, (16) > 0 or (17) > 0. Suppose
(16) > 0. Then xn1 > 0. If in addition (17)  0 then yn1 > 0
since cxn1 < 0. Otherwise if (17) < 0 then n0 > 0 since a2 
0 and n1  0 in the right-hand side of (17). Complementary
slackness then implies that xn0 = yn0 = 0. By Lemma 4,
yn1 > 0. Hence if (16) >0 then xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0.
A similar argument shows that, in the second case (17) > 0,
we also have xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0. 
Lemma 9: Suppose c < 0. If a1  0 then xn1 > 0 and
yn1 > 0 for all n.
Proof: We first claim that 2
R
xn1 + cyn1  0. Suppose
not. Then both sides of (16) are strictly positive. Since c < 0 we
must have xn1 > 0. Since a1  0 and n0  0 we must have
n1 > 0, contradicting the complementary slackness condition
n1xn1 = 0.
Hence 2
R
xn1 + cyn1  0. But this and Lemma 5-ii imply
that cxn1 + 2Byn1 > 0, which in turn implies that yn1 > 0
since cxn1  0. Moreover this is true for all n. We are thus left
to prove that xn1 > 0 for all n.
By Lemma 7 there exists m such that both ym1 and xm1 are
strictly positive. Then m1 = m1 = 0 and hence from (7)
xm1
ym1

= m(xm; ym)

1
2

  A 1

p1
q1

m0 > 0:
The last term is nonpositive since c < 0. Hence i > 0 for
i = 1; 2.
Indeed we claim that for any n if xn1 = 0 then xn0 = yn0 =
0, contradicting Lemma 4. To see this, note that
xn1
yn1

= n(xn; yn)

1
2

+ A 1

 

p1
q1

n0 +

n1
0

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since c < 0, A 1 > 0. Hence xn0 = 0 and 1 > 0 imply that
n0 > 0. This means that xn0 = yn0 = 0 by the complementary
slackness condition (9), contradicting Lemma 4.
Hence x
n1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all users n. 
The case where a2  0 follows a similar argument as in
Lemma 9. Hence the proof of Proposition 6 is complete. 
From Definition 1, equilibrium price p1 = 0 or q1 = 0
if there are excess variable resources. When not both variable
bandwidth and buffer are in excess, we have the following re-
sult. The main idea in the proof is that if x
n1 and yn1 are not
both positive then either the equilibrium condition that demand
equals supply for nonfree resources is violated or Lemma 4 or
assumption A4 is violated.
Proposition 3: Suppose c > 0. If (p; q; xn; yn; n =
1; . . . ; N ) is an equilibrium such that not both p1 = 0 and
q1 = 0, then xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all n.
Proof: For every user n, there are three mutually exclusive
cases: 1) xn1 = yn1 = 0; 2) either xn1 = 0 or yn1 = 0 but not
both; and 3) xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0. We will show that cases 1)
and 2) are impossible, and hence x
n1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all n.
Case 1: 9n such that xn1 = yn1 = 0. From Theorem 2
we know that a1 = r   p1  0. If a1 > 0 then since the
left-hand side of (16) equals zero we have n0 > 0. Comple-
mentary slackness then implies xn0 = yn0 = 0, contradicting
Theorem 2-i. Hence a1 = 0. But then for every m we have from
(16)
2Rxm1 + cym1 =  p1m0 + m1
imposing that xm1 = 0 for every m. Hence X1 =
P
m xm1 =
0. But since a1 = 0, p1 = r > 0 contradicting that p1(X1  
X1) = 0 at equilibrium. Hence for no n does xn1 = yn1 = 0.
Case 2: 9n such that either xn1 = 0 or yn1 = 0 but not
both. We will consider xn1 > 0 and yn1 = 0; the other case is
symmetric.
Since yn1 = 0, by Lemma 4, xn0 > 0 or yn0 > 0, implying
that n0 = 0. Hence from (7)
2Rxn1
cxn1

= n(xn; yn)

a1
a2

+

0
n1

yielding
xn1 = n(xn; yn)a1=
2
R = n(xn; yn)a2=c+ n1=c: (18)
Since n1  0 we have
2Ra2   ca1  0: (19)
Substituting a1 = r   p1 and a2 = b  q1 we have
2Rb  cr  
2
Rq1   cp1: (20)
Now we claim that ym1 = 0 for all users m. Suppose not.
Then for some m we have ym1 > 0 and hence m1 = 0. From
(7) and (11) we get
ym1 = m(xm; ym)2   (
2
Rq1   cp1)m0=jAj
= m(xm; ym)

(2Rb  cr) 

1 +
m0
jAjm(xm; ym)

(2Rq1   cp1)

 0
where the last inequality follows from (20) and the fact that
n0=jAjn(xn; yn)  0. Hence ym1 = 0 for all m and Y1 =P
m ym1 = 0.
This implies q1 = 0 since at equilibrium q1(Y1   Y 1) =
 q1Y 1 = 0. By assumption of the theorem p1 > 0 and X1 =
X1. This implies the existence of m such that
xm1  xm1:
For this m we have from (18), noting that a1 = r p1 > 0 from
(19) and that a2 = b > 0,
m(xm; ym) = xm1
2R
a1
 xm1
2R
a1
 xm1
2R
R1
: (21)
Now since ym1 = 0,
(xm; ym) =xm1r + xm0R0 + ym0B0
v(xm; ym) =x
2
m1
2
R
and hence
v(xm; ym)
(xm; ym)
 xm1
2R
R1
 xm1
2R
R1
 m(xm; ym) (22)
from (21). But v(xm; ym) = x2m12R and hence (22) contradicts
assumption A4. This proves that Case 2 is impossible.
Hence xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all n and the proposition is
proved. 
Propositions 6 and 10 thus prove Theorem 3.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM OF M2
In this section we first discuss how an equilibrium might be
approached, and then present and prove some equilibrium prop-
erties.
A. Convergence
The equilibrium situation with model M2 where user opti-
mization has no budget constraint is simpler. We will relate the
noncooperative individual optimizations to a single-objective
welfare maximization. This not only proves the existence of an
equilibrium, but also provides a nice interpretation for the law
of supply and demand as a price adjustment scheme to approach
an equilibrium.
Consider the welfare maximization
max
(xn;yn;n=1;...;N)0
X
n
fn(xn; yn) (23)
subject to Xi  X i; Yi  Y i: (24)
The dual problem is (see e.g., [3, Section 3.4.2], [14])
min
(p;q)0
D(p; q) =
X
s
Bn(p; q) + (pX + qY ) (25)
where
Bn(p; q) = max
(xn;yn)0
fn(xn; yn)  (pxn + qyn): (26)
Proposition 11: The set of equilibrium allocations is
nonempty and convex. Moreover, (p; q; xn; yn; n =
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1; . . . ; N ) is an equilibrium if and only if (x
n
; y
n
; n =
1; . . . ; N ) solves the welfare maximization (23)–(24) and
(p; q) solves its dual problem (25)–(26).
Proof: Since the objective function of the welfare
maximization is continuous and the feasible set is com-
pact, a maximizer exists. Moreover, since it is concave,
(x
n
; y
n
; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is a maximizer of (23)–(24) if and
only if it satisfies the first-order optimality condition with
a corresponding Lagrange multiplier (p; q). But it can be
verified that this condition is equivalent to Definition 1, and
hence (p; q; x
n
; y
n
; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is an equilibrium. The
convexity of the set of equilibria follows from the concavity of
the welfare maximization. 
The reformulation of user problems in terms of a wel-
fare maximization also suggests a natural price adjustment
scheme to approach an equilibrium. Note that (26) is
equivalent to the user maximization in M2, and that at
price (p; q) that is dual optimal, the price–allocation
pair (p; q; xn(p; q); yn(p; q); n = 1; . . . ; N )
is primal-dual optimal by the duality theory, where
(xn(p; q); yn(p; q)) is a maximizer of user n’s problem.
As noted in the proof of the proposition, it is hence also
an equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1. Hence we will
approach an equilibrium by having the network iteratively
compute a dual-optimal price vector and users respond to it
according to M2.
Indeed we will compute a dual-optimal price vector using the
gradient projection algorithm (e.g., [14], [3]) where the prices
are adjusted in opposite direction of the gradient rD(p; q):
(p(t+ 1); q(t+ 1)) = [(p(t); q(t))  rD(p; q)]+:
Here  > 0 is a step size, and (z)+ = maxfz; 0g. But the
gradient turns out to be just the negative of excess demand
[3, pp. 669] rD(p; q) =  Z(t) where
Z(t) = ((X(p(t); q(t)); Y (p(t); q(t)))   (X; Y ))
and
(X(p(t); q(t)); Y (p(t); q(t)))
=
X
n
xn(p(t); q(t));
X
n
yn(p(t); q(t))

are the aggregate demands at prices (p(t); q(t)). Hence the price
adjustment rule becomes
(p(t+ 1); q(t+ 1)) = [(p(t); q(t)) + Z(t)]+:
This is just the law of supply and demand: if the excess demand
for a resource is positive, raise its price; otherwise reduce it.
A dual optimal price vector is obtained when excess demands
are reduced to zero for nonfree resources. Hence this scheme to
approach an equilibrium (in the sense of Definition 1) can be
thought of as simply the gradient projection algorithm to solve
the dual (and hence the primal welfare maximization) problem.
The algorithm converges provided that the gradient rD(p; q)
of the dual objective function D(p; q) is Lipschitz continuous
[3, pp. 214].
B. Equilibrium Prices and Allocations
Unlike in model M1, here the equilibrium prices are not rel-
ative. But (p0; q0) > 0 as before and hence for fixed resources
supply equals demand. Moreover the total return on fixed re-
sources are the same.
Theorem 12: Let (p; q; xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ). Then p0 >
0, q0 > 0, and hence X0 = X0 and Y0 = Y 0. Moreover
R0=p0 = B0=q0.
Under Assumption A3 the positive equilibrium allocation of
variable resources holds.
Theorem 13: If (xn; yn; n = 1; . . . ; N ) is an equilibrium
allocation then xn1 > 0 and yn1 > 0 for all n.
If we replace the strict inequality in assumption A3 by in-
equality,
A3′: For all (; v) > 0,
@un
@
(; v)
 
@un
@v
(; v)
 2
v

:
then the equilibrium situation becomes more complicated.
There are still users that hold strictly positive amounts of
both variable bandwidth and variable buffer, but there may
be users that hold zero variable resources. Indeed some
users can be “priced out” of the market at equilibrium, i.e.,
(xn; yn) = (0; 0). To express precisely the equilibrium
situation on the allocation of variable resources, let us define
(by slight abuse of notation) N = f1; . . . ; Ng to be the set of
all users, and partition N into four disjoint subsets according to
their equilibrium allocation of variable bandwidth and buffer:
N = N0 [N1 [N11
where N0 is the set of users n that hold zero variable bandwidth
and zero variable buffer xn1 = yn1 = 0, N1 is the set of users
n whose allocations are such that exactly one of x
n1 and yn1 is
strictly positive, and N11 is the set of users n with xn1 > 0 and
yn1 > 0.
Theorem 14: Suppose (p; q; xn; yn; n 2 N ) is an equilib-
rium allocation. If Assumption A3 is replaced by A3′ then
i) N11 6= ;
ii) at most one of N0 and N1 can be nonempty;
iii) if N0 is nonempty then p1 > 0 and q1 > 0;
iv) if N1 is nonempty then p1 = 0 or q1 = 0, or both.
Hence there will always be users who desire both variable re-
sources as in model M1. For the other users either none holds
any variable resources or every user holds exactly one variable
resource. In the former case, supply equals demand for all re-
sources; in the latter case, there will be free variable resource.
In particular if both variable resources are scarce (p1 > 0 and
q1 > 0) then N = N0 [ N11, i.e., a user either desires both
variable resources or none.
C. Proof of Theorem 14
The proof of Theorems 12 and 13 is simple and omitted. We
now prove Theorem 14. The optimality condition for user n is:
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(xn; yn)  0 is optimal if and only if there exists (n; n)  0
such that
R0
@un
@
  p0 + n0 = 0 (27)
B0
@un
@
  q0 + n0 = 0 (28)
r
@un
@
+ 2(2Rxn1 + cyn1)
@un
@v
 p1 + n1 = 0 (29)
b
@un
@
+ 2(cxn1 + 
2
Byn1)
@un
@v
  q1 + n1 = 0 (30)
nixni = 0; niyni = 0; i = 0; 1 (31)
The basic observation is:
Lemma 15: Suppose (xn; yn) is optimal for user n at prices
(p; q).
i) If xn1 > 0 then either yn1 > 0 or p1 = 0, xn0 = yn0 =
0;
ii) If yn1 > 0 then either xn1 > 0 or q1 = 0, xn0 = yn0 =
0;
iii) (p0; p0) > 0. If xn1 = yn1 = 0 then (p1; q1) > 0.
Proof: For part i, suppose xn1 > 0 and yn1 = 0. From
(29) and (31) we have
n(xn; yn) =
2
R
xn1
r
+
p1
r
1
 2
@un
@v
:
Now, v(xn; yn) = 2Rx2n1 and (xn; yn) = xn1r + xn0R0 +
yn0B0. Condition A3′ requires that n  v= and hence
2
R
xn1
r
+
p1
r
1
 2
@un
@v

2
R
x2n1
xn1r + xn0R0 + yn0B0
which can be satisfied if and only if p1 = 0; xn0 = yn0 = 0.
Part ii can be proved in a similar manner. Part iii follows from
(27)–(30) and A2. 
We can now prove Theorem 14.
Proof (Theorem 14): We will prove in the reverse order.
Part iv follows from Lemma 15-i and ii. Part iii follows from
Lemma 15-iii. For part ii, supposeN0 6=  and hence (p1; q1) >
0. But then Lemma 15-i and ii imply that, for all users n, xn1 >
0, yn1 > 0, i.e., n 2 N0 [ N11. Hence N1 = .
To prove part i, note that at equilibrium since (p0; q0) > 0
there exists a user n with xn0 > 0 or yn0 > 0. Such an n
must satisfy xn1 > 0 , yn1 > 0 by Lemma 15-i and ii,
i.e., if xn0 > 0 or yn0 > 0 then n 2 N0 [ N11. If some of
such users n are in N11 then the theorem is proved. If all such
users n are in N0, then we claim that there exists a user m with
xm0 = ym0 = 0 that is in N11.
To see this, note that N0 6=  and hence (p1; q1) > 0 by
Lemma 15-iii and N1 =  by part ii of the theorem. But these
imply that X1 > 0 and Y1 > 0 and moreover xm1 > 0 ,
ym1 > 0. Hence N11 6= . 
V. CONCLUSION
We have described a model for resource allocation schemes
that provide a user with a fixed and a variable share of band-
width and buffer. When these users interact by exchanging
their resource allocations in order to maximize their benefit, an
equilibrium results at which the marginal increase in utility due
to the higher expected return of variable resources is balanced
by the marginal decrease in utility due to their variability. We
have studied two models of user behavior. For the first model
we have shown that at equilibrium all users desire strictly
positive amounts of variable bandwidth and buffer. This implies
that ABR or variable bit rate (VBR) may be more suitable
than continuous bit rate (CBR) services for elastic traffics. The
characterization of equilibrium prices may also be useful in the
design of price adjustment scheme. For example prices can first
be computed according to the law of supply and demand and
then projected into the feasible domain of equilibrium prices.
An example in [12] shows that this can significantly speed
up convergence toward an equilibrium. For the second model
we show that there are still users who desire both variable
resources, but there will also be users who hold none or one of
the variable resources depending on the scarcity of the variable
resources. When both variable bandwidth and buffer are scarce
every user either holds both or none. Moreover, some users can
be squeezed out of service completely.
This paper presents a first step toward understanding the equi-
librium situation of a network shared by a large number of users
under such resource allocation schemes. As we have seen, some
of the properties are not intuitive and their analysis can be rather
intricate but tedious. Whether equilibrium analysis can be fruit-
fully exploited in the design and management of networks, as it
is in economics [15], remains to be seen.
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